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Abstract 
This study investigates the factors that influence the completion of an initial public offering 
(IPOs) on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). We use a probit regression model to 
analysis the effect of News Coverage on withdrawal likelihood, we find that News Coverage 
around the time of an issuing firm’s IPO is positively related to IPO completion. News 
coverage enables a greater dissemination of information related to the company and the IPO, 
which in turn reduces information asymmetry. In line with previous finding of Boeh and 
Southam (2011), news articles also arguably signal lower agency costs and therefore can also 
be linked to a higher probability of IPO completion. Mahalanbis distance matching approach 
was adopted to match each company that withdrew its offering from the ASX with a similar 
company that had a successful IPO during the same period. We use this matching technique 
to explore partially underwritten IPOs, which is where only a proportion of an IPO is 
underwritten. We find that almost 20 percent of companies that were not underwritten 
withdrew their offerings, compared to less than 10 percent of companies that were partially 
underwritten. With a fully underwritten IPO, the underwriter who takes title to the firm’s 
shares would bare the risk of undersubscription and it appears that being partially 
underwritten would therefore remove at least some of this risk.  
Keywords: Initial Public Offering, IPO, Withdrawal, Australia, ASX, Capital Raising, 
Nearest-Neighbour Matching, Propensity Score Matching, Underwritten IPOs, Media 
Coverage, News Articles 
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Investigation of Australian IPOs: Road Blocks to becoming a Public Company 
Chapter 1 
1.1 Introduction 
The initial public offering (IPO) is an important financial issue for companies, investors, and 
academics. As the name suggests, an IPO is the first sale of stock by a private company to the 
public domain, which enables the stock to trade on an exchange such as the Australian 
Securities Exchange (ASX). The IPO is a key milestone for many privately held companies 
as it provides access to a large public capital market and it provides the investor with a liquid 
security with an established market value. Since Ibbotson’s (1975) seminal paper on the risk 
and performance of IPOs identified the importance of initial public offering research, this 
topic has become very well documented in the finance literature.  
A company will ‘go public’ for several reasons, including raising capital and building 
a public profile. Typically, IPOs are conducted by small, early-stage companies seeking 
capital to expand their businesses and provide a way for their early-stage investors to 
monetise their initial investments. The IPO will attract attention from the financial media 
which can also enhance the company’s image and reputation. Following the IPO, companies 
usually list their shares on a stock exchange to facilitate the trading of the stock. It may also 
improve the company’s corporate image and brand awareness since listed companies tend to 
be more closely watched by the financial media and are better able to have their information 
disseminated, i.e., through data aggregators such as Bloomberg. Large privately-owned 
companies might also conduct IPOs to obtain a market valuation and build a stock-based 
long-term incentive plan.  
In Australia, an offer is underwritten by the use of a ‘standby’ agreement, which is 
similar to the firm commitment agreement in the United States (US) which stipulates that the 
underwriter will purchase the balance of any unpurchased shares in the IPO. Companies 
within Australia use one of two methods when issuing new shares. The first is an ‘open’ 
priced offer, incorporates ‘book building’ through the institutional offer period; typically, this 
is used for very large floats and involves a price discovery process. The second is the most 
commonly used ‘fixed’ price offering.  
There are significant one-time and ongoing costs with going public and being a 
publicly listed company. The cost of listing on the ASX can be substantial with initial listing 
fees of $475,000 and an additional $75,000 annually for a firm valued at $1,000 million. 
Costs also include the appointment of a team of advisers and experts: including 
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accountants/auditors, corporate advisers, lawyers, and underwriters. Regulatory agencies 
(e.g., Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC)) and disclosure requirements 
(e.g., quarterly and annual reports and shareholder meetings) require additional direct costs. 
Indirect costs associated with the IPO (e.g., management time) are also substantial.  
A hidden cost that exceeds the other issue costs is the dilution of share value 
associated with short-run underpricing which is characterised by the pattern of positive 
average initial stock returns with initial return being defined as the percentage change 
between the offering price and the closing price on the first trading day. Underpricing has 
been well documented in the literature with Ibbotson (1975) reporting that IPOs in the 1960’s 
in the United States (US) were underpriced by approximately 11.4 percent. Extensive studies 
by Ritter (1984), Smith (1986), Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1994) and most recently Ritter 
and Welch (2002) all found average underpricing levels beyond 15 percent within the U.S. 
Additionally, Ibbotson (1975) reporting that only 16 percent are accurately priced. The 
average level of underpricing in Australia has been reported by Loughran, Ritter, and 
Rydqvist (1994), a paper which was updated May 2015, to be 21.8%, this number has been 
calculated incorporating underpricing numbers from Lee, Taylor and Walter (1996) which 
sampled 1,562 companies from 1976 to 2011.  
According to Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1988), the pricing of IPOs is ‘difficult, 
both because there is no observable market price before the offering and because many of the 
issuing firms have little or no operating history. If the price is set too low, the issuer does not 
get the full advantage of its ability to raise capital. If it is priced too high, then the investor 
would get an inferior return and consequently might reject the offering.’ It is evident that 
pricing is a critical aspect of having a well-functioning IPO market.  
Rather than accept an underpriced IPO, a company may decide to withdraw the IPO, 
and this may have strategic implications for the firm. Firms that withdraw will forego the 
financing and other benefits associated with going public, and they also face other direct and 
indirect costs. The IPO process enlists the efforts of company managers, accountants, 
underwriters, printing companies, and legal advisors and is a time-consuming process with 
significant regulatory fees. Additionally, a failed IPO can also damage the firm's reputation; 
Dunbar and Foerster (2008) finds that only 9% of issuers that withdraw return to successfully 
conduct an IPO, Boeh and Dunbar (2013) state that 13% return for a successful IPO, 
suggesting that withdrawal may preclude future access to the public capital markets. 
Alternatively, Boeh and Dunbar (2013) shows that companies apart from those who 
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successfully return for an IPO, valuations from post withdrawal event are significantly 
discounted.  
One should not mistakenly conclude that only poor-quality firms withdraw their IPOs. 
In 1998, Goldman Sachs withdrew its IPO, citing ‘poor market conditions’. Rather than 
accept a low valuation (15 billion USD), the company withdrew its IPO. The following year, 
Goldman returned for a successful IPO with yielded a market valuation of 35 billion USD, 
based on the first day of trading. Prior to the IPO, the company can elect to withdraw the 
offering from the market for several reasons, including unfavourable market conditions.  
US IPOs are heavily studied, yet withdrawals are not, even though withdrawal is a 
frequent outcome. Studies in the finance literature e.g. Busaba, Benveniste, and Guo (2001); 
Dunbar (1998); Boeh and Southam (2011); Boeh and Dunbar (2016) report that the rate of 
failed US IPOs has increased considerably since the 1980s, and approximately one third of all 
IPOs are withdrawn prior to completion. To the best of our knowledge, there have been no 
studies on withdrawn IPOs in the Australian market, but our data suggests that the percentage 
of withdrawn IPOs is significantly lower, 3-17% for the period from 2004 – 2014.  
Busaba et al. (2001) equate the ability of firms to withdraw poorly received offerings 
to an option; if the firm perceives the offer price to be too low, it has the option to simply 
withdraw the offering and walk away from the current IPO process. The existence of this 
withdrawn IPO option presents the opportunity for us to analyse the costs and benefits of 
going public. Busaba et al. (2001) equate the firm’s initial IPO filing to be the equivalent of 
purchasing a call option. One reason owners and entrepreneurs of the IPOs would be willing 
to withdraw is the existence of superior alternative sources of financing such as lines of credit 
or additional private equity. It may be the case that some companies may explore the 
possibility of listing while simultaneously exploring other opportunities and come to the 
determination that better terms are available elsewhere (Boeh & Dunbar, 2013). Alternatively, 
the owner’s private information might not be reflected in the offering.   
By matching each withdrawn company with a similar company that has had a 
successful IPO, we can gain insights into the withdrawal decision. This thesis employs a 
probit regression analysis and the Mahalanobis distance matching technique to deal with 
selection bias. This technique is used in conjunction with prohibit regression-based model to 
identify which baseline factors relating to the IPO issuing company, or the IPO details are 
confounding factors which need to be controlled for. Matching each firm that has withdrawn 
its IPO from the ASX between 2004 and 2014 with a comparable company that had a 
successful IPO on the ASX allows unbiased estimation of the impact of the factors of interest 
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on the withdrawal likelihood. Tracking of withdrawn companies provides an insight into the 
effect of withdrawal on a company’s future within the Australian context. To assess the 
impact of potential road blocks to going public, companies will be matched on certain 
baseline attributes relating to the company and the initial public offering as well as the reason 
the company is raising capital. These attributes were identified as having an impact on 
withdrawal and thus by matching the companies that are most similar regarding these 
attributes we remove selection bias that would otherwise be present. 
The analysis presented examines the effect of having no media attention on 
withdrawal probability. Furthermore, we examine the effect of IPO being partially 
underwritten withdrawal probability. In each instance, the increase or decrease in the 
probability of the IPO being withdrawn is quantified.  
The determination of the quantum of the probability increase or decrease is aimed at 
providing further insight into IPO design and factors that influence IPO completion. The 
development of this measure provides further opportunity to analysis the relationship 
between the increase or decrease of the risk of withdrawing to the cost of being partially 
underwritten or costs involved in generating media attention. To date, research has not been 
conducted to evaluate the extent of any factors on withdrawal likelihood.  
Prior research on media in Australian IPOs examined the effect of optimistic news 
stories on first-day pricing of IPOs between 1995 and 2005 (Carey, 2016; P. J. Lee et al., 
1996). We explore the notion that news articles aid in information dissemination which 
increases IPO completion rates. 
This study examines the notion that news coverage is an important mechanism for 
information dissemination which is key in overcoming asymmetric information, allowing for 
greater exposure of the company’s IPO. While these reasons can be speculated upon the 
emphasis of this thesis is to examine whether the news coverage impacts on the probability of 
withdrawal.  
The second emphasis of this thesis is to examine the value in having an initial public 
offering partially underwritten. It is evident having an IPO fully underwritten removes the 
risk of the IPO being undersubscribed as the underwritten has agreed upon the purchase and 
resale of all the shares or the purchase of the remaining unsold shares. One would assume 
that being partially underwritten would, therefore, remove some risk associated with 
undersubscription of the IPO. This thesis attempts to quantify that risk reduction regarding 
the impact on the probability of withdrawal. 
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1.2 Motivation 
IPO studies have received wide interest, with reviews completed by Ritter and Welch (2002),  
Kent (2002), Ritter (2011) and Ritter (2015). Analysts, investors and executives consider the 
IPO to be a key capital raising decision.   
Investigating the costs versus benefits of Australian IPOs has practical implications. 
The ASX Listings and Issuer Services Management has provided us with a list of their most 
pressing research questions and their top priority is to understand the costs and benefits of 
being an ASX-listed firm. This question has ties into the entrepreneurial landscape and is 
important to the more than 2,000 firms that are currently listed on the ASX and to the 
thousands of Australian start-ups that at some point in time will contemplate a listing.  
There is a large degree of heterogeneity in IPOs in different countries. A key 
difference between the Australian and the US IPO market is the structure of the issuing 
methods. In the US, the bookbuilding method is the preferred offering mechanism, whereas 
within Australia the fixed pricing method is preferred. The fixed price method is said to be an 
important difference between the Australian and the prevailing U.S. environment, where 
subscription prices are often not determined until (non-binding) offers have been received 
from potential subscribers (P. J. Lee et al., 1996) citing (Hanley, 1993); (Suchard & Singh, 
2007). These institutional differences are explored and help direct the inferences we draw 
from our findings.  
The fixed price method sets the issuance price prior to the listing announcement. 
Whereas, the bookbuilding method sets a range of prices with the final offering price set at 
the end of the marketing period. The key difference with the bookbuilding method that is 
commonly used during the roadshow process within the U.S. is that bidding information is 
not share between participants, whereas the ASX bookbuilding facility offers a live feed of 
the bidding information as it’s generated, this is intended to reduce information asymmetry 
between participants.  
In Australia, not all IPO’s are underwritten, and a fixed price offering is the preferred 
method as opposed to book building which predominates in the US. In addition, Australian 
regulation makes it illegal for aftermarket manipulation to occur while in the US, it is 
common for the underwriter discourages ‘flipping’ (the immediate selling of stock in the 
aftermath that were bought at the IPO price); this controversial practice carried out by large 
institutional investors as well as small traders and accounts for 60 to 70 per cent (Aggarwal, 
2000) of first day trading volume. Furthermore, it is common practice for Australian IPO 
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applicants to include earnings forecasts in their prospectus as it is perceived to be intended 
practice by law where in the U.S., it is quite rare for a firm to disclose such information. 
This research is motivated by the need to understand the costs and benefits of 
Australian IPOs. Given the costliness of the IPO process, we hope to shed light on how firms 
can improve their prospects for a successful IPO.  
1.3 Contribution 
We study withdrawn Australian IPOs with the hope of better understanding the withdrawal 
decision and the costs and benefits of being listed on the ASX. Through this, we contribute to 
the literature in several ways. Most importantly, this constitutes the first study of withdrawn 
IPOs within the Australian market. Additionally, no studies have been conducted that test the 
impact of being partially underwritten or the role of media coverage on the completion of an 
IPO. 
An ongoing issue with IPO research is that it focuses on US firms; in (Ritter & Welch, 
2002) highly cited Journal of Finance review, they acknowledge this ‘U.S.-centric point of 
view’. While the U.S. IPO literature is expansive, there are relatively few international 
studies (most focus on underpricing) and only a handful of Australian IPO studies. The 
proposed study serves to fill this gap in the literature.  
Our study finds that 11.38% of Australian firms withdraw their IPOs during the period 
from 1 January 2004 to 31 December 201. Given this prevalence, we examine several 
determinants of IPO withdrawal/completion, including how no media coverage at the time of 
the IPO increases withdrawal likelihood by 13.03%.   
Our sample is large (865 deals), recent (2004 – 2014), and includes periods before, 
during and after the 2007 – 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Much of the data has been 
hand-collected from prospectuses filed with the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC). This study finds that no media coverage is found to be a significant 
determinant affecting withdrawal probability for companies undertaking and IPO. Also, we 
find that whether the IPO is partially underwritten has a significant determinant impact on 
withdrawal probability; in each instance, we quantify the effect these factors have on 
withdrawal probability. These appear to offer several potential measures for future Australia 
IPO studies. They also allow companies to carefully consider these factors when undertaking 
an IPO and on the design of their offerings accordingly. 
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Rationale for the Initial Public Offering 
A start-up company may quickly exhaust the founders' personal savings yet need more capital 
to fund the growing business. Bank loans are a common, quick and easy way to raise capital, 
but the cash-draining interest costs that accompany debt can be prohibitive. The company 
may consider private placement with a few small investors (‘angels’) or venture capitalists, 
but these alternatives may be accompanied by a demand for controlling equity interest which 
would result in ownership dilution and a significant loss of power. If the company is large 
enough, it may consider selling shares to the general public at an initial public offering (IPO). 
Ritter and Welch (2002) state that the choice to go public in most cases is motivated by the 
desire to raise equity capital as well as the preference of risk averse major initial shareholders 
to diversify their personal portfolios or exit the company and seek a public market to convert 
their wealth into cash. However, Gilson and Black (1998) show that entrepreneurs frequently 
take back control from venture capitalist at the time of IPO. Ritter and Welch (2002) also 
state that non-monetary reasons (i.e., desire to increase the firm’s public profile) play only a 
small role in the decision to IPO.  
In their twelve European country investigation of the decision to go public, Bancel 
and Mittoo (2009) survey chief financial officers (CFOs) and report that enhanced visibility 
and financing for growth as the most important motivating factors which is consistent with 
U.S. studies as summarised by Brau and Fawcett (2006). However, European firms differed 
significantly on outside monitoring which was considered a major benefit by European CFOs 
but a major cost by U.S. CFOs. Bancel and Mittoo (2009) results suggest that the decision to 
go public is a complex one, and cannot be explained by one single theory because firms seek 
multiple benefits in going public. These motivations are influenced by the firm’s ownership 
structure, size, and age as well as by the home country’s institutional and regulatory 
environment.  
2.2 IPO Process  
In Australia, it is common for a new company to be created for the sole purpose of acting as a 
listing vehicle. In this situation, existing shareholders dispose of their shares to the new 
company rather than to the public. The primary reason for utilising this structure is to limit 
prospectus liability for the shareholders; this refers to the automatic personal liability that 
applies to directors of the company for issuing a defective prospectus. 
In Australia, a company is required to prepare a prospectus, under which it will offer 
the shares to the public. This prospectus contains is required to contain all information that 
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investors or their professional advisers would reasonably require, and reasonably expect to 
find in the prospectus, to make an informed assessment of material matters relating to the 
company including: the assets and liabilities, financial position, profits and losses and 
prospects of the company; and the rights attaching to the securities being offered (Piper, 
2015). It is also common that an issuing firm includes forecasts in the prospectuses in 
Australia. How, Lam and Yeo (2007) found that these forecasts are strongly associated with 
the average Price to Earnings and Price to Book multiples of two comparable firms (matched 
on industry, growth, and size). The type of information with an issuing firm’s prospectus has 
found to be an informative predictor of firm survival. A. P. Lamberto, S. Rath (2008) found 
that the number of risk factors contained within a prospectus and the size of the firm are 
negatively related to survival of the firm, whereas, size of the offering and forecast dividend 
yield are positively related to firm survival. 
2.2.1 Underwriting Agreement 
The prospectus will also contain the details of the underwriting agreement if the issue 
is underwritten. The negotiations and finalisation of the underwriting agreement typically 
occurs a several weeks before the prospectus is lodge with ASIC. An offer is underwritten by 
the use of a ‘standby’ agreement, which is similar to the firm commitment agreement in the 
U.S. The standby agreement stipulates that the underwriter will purchase the balance or a of 
any unpurchased shares in the IPO. Alternatively the agreement may stipulate that the issue is 
partially underwritten. This is where the underwriter underwrites the issue up to a certain 
number of securities or a particular amount, refered to as the underwritten amount. Contrary 
to an agreement made in the US, in Australia the guarantee made by the underwriter to 
underwrite the issue is negotiated and given before the propespectus is lodge with ASIC. This 
can be contrasted against the timing of the guarantee given by underwriters in the US, these 
arent The underwriting agreement may also contain an out clause which specifies how the 
underwriter can escape the agreement, for example, the S&P ASX 200 Index is for 5 or more 
days at any time after the date of the undewriting agreement 95% or less than its respective 
level as at the clsoe of business on the business day prior to the date of the underwriting 
agreement. 
2.2.2 Offer method 
Companies within Australia use two main methods for issuing new shares. The first 
method is an ‘open’ priced offer; also known as a bookbuilding offer, and the second is a 
‘fixed’ price offer. The open price offer which is typically used for very large listings in 
Australia consists of two periods; the first is an institutional offer period. This period consists 
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of a bookbuild, which is a method of surveying institutional investors where they provide an 
indication of the number of shares they would like to take up and the price at which they are 
prepared to pay. This method is intended to maximise the offer price because the investment 
bank builds a book of demand for the shares in the IPO. Upon collections of the bids from 
investors the investment bank will close the book and set a final offer price (Busaba et al., 
2001) This process can be utilised within the institutional marketing campaign which takes 
place before a prospectus has been lodged with ASIC, and can be used to determine the fixed 
price that will be contained in the  prospectus. Alternatively, a price range can be specified in 
the prospectus with the final price set at the end the offer period, the minimum of which must 
be 20 cents. After the institutional offer period has expired, the retail offer commences; this 
period occurs after the company has lodged its prospectus with the ASIC which ensure that 
retail investors are fully informed because of the stringent reporting requirements. The 
prospectus may contain either a fixed price or a range of prices (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2011).   
The ASX Bookbuild Facility, launched by the ASX in October 2013, is a tool that 
brokers and investment banks can also utilise to help advise the IPO company on how to 
price and allocate the new shares to reflect market demand. This automated on-market 
bookbuild service was introduced to provide issuers of securities with an alternative to the 
existing off-market (e.g., the process happens behind closed doors) bookbuild processes 
commonly used when conducting capital raising. For the automated process to be utilised, the 
company must have already lodged a listing application and been assigned an ASX security 
code. The bookbuild takes place within parameters set by the issuer, including opening price 
and a minimum number of shares on issue. If the offering is open to retail investors, a 
disclosure document or product disclosure statement (PDS) or a document that is both must 
also have been lodged with ASIC.  
The most commonly used offering method is fixed price which discloses a 
subscription price set by the underwriter (or corporate adviser) within the prospectus. This 
fixed price can be determined using an institutional bookbuild prior to the offer period, or the 
price can be determined using market research (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011).    
If the fixed price offer method is used by a listing firm, they do not have the ability to 
change the price and quantity of shares on offer. This is said to be an important difference 
between the Australian and the prevailing U.S. environment, where the widely-used 
bookbuild method does not determine the subscription price until after (non-binding) offers 
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have been received from potential subscribers (P. J. Lee et al. (1996) citing Hanley (1993); 
Suchard and Singh (2007)).  
Some research has identified the book building process as being more efficient than 
alternatives (Benveniste & Spindt, 1989) and further aided in the process of price discovery 
by investors placing limit orders (Cornelli & Goldreich, 2003). An additional feature of US 
bookbuilding is that they do not have to disclose issuer's reservation (offer) price in the 
regulatory filings (see your new table). Brisely and Busaba (2007) conclude that a policy of 
nondisclosure increases proceeds for firms who are most likely to be in the IPO market. This 
is another institutional difference that explains why bookbuilding is less common in Australia 
(Brisley & Busaba, 2007).   
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Table 1 – Contrasting Institutional Details Between Australia and US IPO Process 
US Australia 
Underwritten contract type 
Best efforts. Underwriter does its best to sell the offering and receives fee in 
proportion to the issue distributed Brau and Fawcett (2006). 
No equivalent 
Firm commitment. Underwriter commits to purchase shares upfront then 
repackage and sell (distribute) them. Underwriter is liable for any shortfall in 
demand. 
 
Stand-by underwriting agreement.  
Bancel and Mittoo (2009) is equivalent to firm commitment. Offer be either 
fully or partially underwritten. 
Fully underwritten.  Underwriter commits to purchase any unsold shares. 
 
 
No equivalent Partially underwritten. Underwriter agrees to purchase any unsold shares 
up to the underwritten proportion agreed to in advance. 
No equivalent Non-underwritten. Offering sold through brokers; 18% of Australian IPOs 
are not underwritten (Piper, 2015). 
Regulatory Filings 
Preliminary Prospectus. S-1 files prior to pre-selling; need not include offering 
price which is often changed (S-1A) prior to IPO (Hanley, 1993). 
None. Prior to filing of prospectus, formal pre-selling is illegal J. How et al. 
(2007) and issue cannot be marketed to retail investors.  
Prospectus must contain offering price and number of shares; file at last minute. Prospectus must contain offering price (or range) and number of shares, 
neither of which can be changed. Filed in advance of IPO (e.g., 5-7 weeks). 
Pricing  
Bought deal. Firm commitment offering where the underwriter sets price before 
approaching investors. 
Best efforts. Underwriter sets the price and quantity of shares to sell at the outset. 
Fixed price offering. Price is provided in prospectus (and cannot be 
changed); 97% of deals in this study were fixed price deals.  
Informal book-building. Underwriters may undertake institutional book-
building during pre-marketing phase prior to filing of prospectus. 
Book-building. Roadshows used for price discovery and price set just prior to 
IPO.  
 
 
Open price offering. Prospectus provides a range; only 3% of deals contain 
range (larger deals). 
ASX (online) or formal underwriter book-build occur after prospectus is 
filed; rarely used.  
 
After-Market 
IPO occurs on first day of trading  IPO offering period begins 1 week after prospectus is issued and lasts 1-3 
weeks for retail and 1 week for institutional prior to ASX trading. 
Flipping is discouraged. 
Greenshoe is common. 
Institutional investors can sell their shares and over-allotment option is very 
rare (Busaba et al., 2001). 
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2.3 Benefits and Opportunities of the Initial Public Offering 
The IPO enables the private firm to access the public capital market through the sale of its stock. 
While the main reason for going public is argued by Ritter and Welch (2002) to be to raise new 
capital to finance growth, Kim and Weisbach (2008) find while analysing IPOs from 38 countries 
that while almost all firms going public raise a significant amount of new capital, not all of this is 
used for financing growth but some of the other reasons include increasing working capital and 
rebalancing leverage.  
An established public market improves the company’s future financial position, because 
it can offer investors a more liquid security with an established market value. Merton (1987)  
suggests that the IPO usually improves the company’s net worth by reducing the cost of equity 
capital attributed to the increase in investor recognition and the increase in the shareholder base. 
The improvement in the debt-to-equity ratio opens the door to borrowing additional funds when 
the need arises. Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) state that this is the primary reason for 
Italian firms during 1982 and 1992 to go public and experience a reduction their in cost of credit 
after going public.  
During the IPO process, the attention of the financial media focuses on the company 
providing free publicity which can also enhance the company’s image and thereby strengthen the 
company’s competitive position in the industry. With a public market for the shares, the company 
can include stock options in the compensation package which improves employee motivation 
and aids in attracting and retaining the best employees. Additionally, listing on a stock exchange 
may also improve the company’s corporate image and brand awareness as listed companies are 
more closely watched by the financial media and are better able to have their information 
disseminated. 
2.4 Costs and Obligations of the Initial Public Offering 
There are numerous ongoing costs and obligations associated with being a publicly-traded 
company related to information disclosure to both investors and regulators.  
Regulatory agencies (ASIC in Australia) require public disclosure of pertinent facts about 
the business, operations, management, shareholders, and financial position. These requirements 
may increase the company’s dependence on accountants, auditors, lawyers, and outside advisors. 
Disclosure of information to shareholders through semi-annual and annual reports and 
shareholder meetings requires additional direct costs and management time and may result in lost 
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revenues associated with disclosing any proprietary information to the public (which includes 
direct competitors). Maksimovic and Pichler (2001) argue that the disclosure of this information 
may be advantageous to competitors. On the other hand, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that 
the increased disclosure requirements increase transparency and therefore, lower agencies cost 
and facilitate better corporate governance.  
The cost of listing on the ASX can be substantial with the monetary costs including the 
appointment of advisers and experts; including accountants/auditors, corporate advisers, lawyers 
and underwriters. Typically, an underwriters fee is approximately in the range of 2% to 8% of the 
totally amount raised. The commission paid to underwriters is proportional to the risk of the 
issue, and owing to economies of scale, is also inversely proportional to the size of the offering 
(Ritter, 1987). Depending on the work involved and the size of the business ASX listing fees, 
fees incurred in hiring lawyers, accountants and experts, as well as registry and printing fees 
usually range from approximately $300,000 to $800,000. Larger IPOs can incur other fees that 
exceeding $1 million (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011).   
Indirect costs associated with the IPO are also substantial. Enormous amounts of 
management time and effort are consumed by preparing for offering, but unfortunately, no data 
exists on the monetary equivalents of these costs. A hidden cost that exceeds the other issue costs 
is the dilution of share value associated with underpricing; this is an extremely important aspect 
of IPO theory that will be expounded upon in section 2.5 Short-run Underpricing.  
Sometimes it may not be in the shareholders’ best interests to issue stock. According to 
Myers and Majlui (1984), in cases where the inside managers know more than investors and 
believe their stock to be undervalued, it is preferable for the company to use debt rather than 
equity financing. If managers have ‘used up their ability to issue low-risk debt’, they advise 
turning down positive net-present value projects rather than finance them with risky securities as 
the costs of the IPO would outweigh the benefits. Lucas and McDonald (1990) developed an 
asymmetric information model where an IPO is deferred if owners of the firm know that it is 
currently being undervalued. 
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2.5 Short-run Underpricing (‘Leaving Money on the Table’) 
Short-run underpricing is characterised by the pattern of positive average initial returns of 
the stock with initial return being defined as the percentage change between the offering price 
and the closing price on the first trading day. Underpricing has been well documented in the 
literature beginning with Ibbotson (1975), who first provided convincing evidence that IPOs, on 
average, were underpriced. 
The average level of underpricing in Australia between 1976 and 2011 has been reported 
by Loughran et al. (1994) [updated December 2015] to be 21.8%; this number has been 
calculated incorporating underpricing numbers from Lee, Taylor & Walter (1996). Additionally, 
Ritter and Welch (2002) report that 70 percent of IPOs are underpriced and only 16 percent are 
accurately priced. 
As an IPO is a common exit strategy for Venture capital (VC) backed firms, the 
sharemarket performance of these firms has been considered. This has been examined by da 
Silva Rosa et al. (2003) who found that the level of underpricing of these firm’s IPO was not 
significantly difference from non-venture capital backed IPOs, further, they found that VC 
backed firms do not underperform in the after-market. There results conflict with the hypothesis 
that VC-backed IPOs are certified as high quality. 
Many different models have been proposed to explain short-run underpricing with most 
focusing on important information asymmetries within and between the following market 
participants: the issuers; the underwriters; the initial investors in the IPO; and the larger set of 
investors in the secondary market. In the adverse selection model, some investors are informed 
while others are not; while in the moral hazard model, underwriters possess private and valuable 
information about the market; and in the signalling models, a small number of existing 
shareholders possess inside information about the company. The models generally assume that 
one group has superior information on firm value and that the other agents know this and behave 
accordingly. Each of the models can only cope with two relationships at a time and to simplify 
must ignore all other relationships. 
2.6 Media coverage and IPOs 
Lang and Lundholm (2000) examined corporate disclosure activity of 41 small 
companies in the US around season equity offerings and its relationship to stock prices. They 
suggest that the disclosures reduce information asymmetry inherent in the offering or ‘hype’ the 
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stock which ultimately may have successfully lowered the firms’ cost of equity capital. Myers 
and Majlui (1984) argue that if information asymmetry cannot be resolved, issuing companies 
will view undertaking an offering of either debt or equity will be costly for existing shareholders. 
This motivates the managers to disclose informative news to mitigate against information 
asymmetry and therefore reduce the firms’ cost of capital Lang and Lundholm (2000). 
Media coverage plays an important role in the dissemination of information at the time of 
IPOs, but it is the nature of the news articles, informative or noninformative, that is critical in 
reducing the asymmetric information between the issuing firms and outside investors (Chahine, 
Mansi, & Mazboudi, 2015). Media coverage facilitates the formation of opinions by investors 
who otherwise would lack the required knowledge about the firm that is going public (Pollock & 
Rindova, 2003); (Rodgers, Skinner, & Zechman, 2016).  
DuCharme, Rajgopal, and Sefcik (2001) extend the notion of hype by looking at the level 
of underpricing of IPOs of Internet companies and find that the greater the media exposure just 
prior to the offering the great the level of underpricing. The ‘buzz’ created by the media exposure 
is argued to create a market for the new firm’s shares thereby leading on to more price run up on 
the actual day of the offer as the hype fuels momentum trading. The author suggests that the 
owners of the firm foregoes the potential incremental return which is created by the media 
attention as they want to leave a good taste in investors mouths as they anticipate an immediate 
need to return to the capital markets.  
In the Australian context, Ho, Taher, Lee, and Fargher (2001) also examine the effect of 
media exposure on underpricing. The authors suggest that exposure in print and electronic media 
generates awareness among potential investors, which increases the level of demand for the 
newly listed stock. Like in DuCharme et al. (2001), they find a positive relationship between the 
level of underpricing and the level of media exposure. The second tenant is also similar in that it 
offers supporting logic for why the issuing company would leave money on the table.  
Carey, Fang and Zhang (2016) analysed the impact of optimistic news stories on the first 
day underpricing of IPOs in Australia between 1995 and 2005. They find that optimistic news 
stories are negatively associated with IPO underpricing. They argue that issuing firms 
compensate investors for information asymmetry by lowering the issue price and thus ‘leave 
money on the table’ which causes underpricing. They look at optimistic news stories for 30 days 
prior to the listing date because as they state: ‘IPO offers to retail investors start after the 
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lodgement of listing application and usually are open for 3–4 weeks’. They also state that where 
a fixed offer price is used, new stories preceding the IPO listing date is unlikely to be informative 
to professional investors but may play a role to retail or ‘uninformed’ investors. They argue that 
new stories are potentially an important source of information for uninformed investors. They 
then reference Rock’s (1986) winners curse reiterating that uninformed investors may hesitate to 
participate in the subscription.  
2.7 The Decision to Withdraw 
At any time during the IPO process in the US until the shares are priced, and the 
underwriter commits to purchase the shares (typically the day before the offering) and in 
Australia at any time after the prospectus has been lodge with ASIC, the issuing company can 
simply elect to withdraw the offering from the market. Not only do companies that withdraw 
offerings forego the financing and other benefits associated with going public, but failed 
offerings also have other substantial direct and indirect costs. The IPO process itself enlists the 
efforts of a team of company managers, accountants, underwriters, printing companies, and legal 
advisors and results in substantial fees, and enormous amounts of management time and effort – 
most of which are not recoverable should the offering fail. A failed offering can also irreversibly 
damage the firm’s reputation; Dunbar and Foerster (2008) find that only 9% of firms with 
withdrawn IPOs ever return to have a successful IPO suggesting that the market typically gives a 
company only a single chance to go public. Therefore, the largest potential cost of the failed 
offering may be that it severely limits the firm’s access to capital from the IPO markets in the 
future.  
In both Australia and the US, firms have the ability to withdraw IPOs when demand is 
weak. Busaba (2006) considers this to be a real option and therefore to have value. Busaba 
describes how the value of the option can vary depending on offering method. We believe that 
the value of the offering can also vary depending on regulatory frameworks. A key institutional 
difference between Australia and the US is the ability of US issuers to adjust the IPO price as 
described by Hanley (1993). We believe that the US firm’s ability to adjust its price upwards 
could also be considered a real option; one that is not available to Australian firms. If this option 
were to be available, we hypothesise that fewer Australian firms would need to withdraw their 
IPOs since they could simply adjust their offer price after reading market sentiments. This is an 
institutional difference that explains why bookbuilding is less common in Australia.      
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Dunbar (1998) finds that offering size and underwriter reputation are significant 
determinants of completion, but reports that the impact is positive only for firm-commitment 
offerings, the mechanism used for most U.S. IPOs. However, Busaba et al. (2001) find that 
offering size and underwriter reputation are not key determinants of completion. Boeh and 
Southam (2011) introduce a typology of agency costs and signals that investors use to make 
decisions about the IPO. They argue that information about agency costs are contained within 
signals of levels of monitoring, information asymmetry, bonding, and incentive alignment. Their 
results show that where lower agency costs are signalled this is associated with a greater 
likelihood of IPO completion. 
A company can choose to discontinue the IPO listing process citing a number of reasons, 
including unfavourable market conditions. According to studies in the finance literature (e.g., 
Dunbar (1998); Busaba et al. (2001)), a significant proportion (between 20% and 50% annually) 
of U.S. IPOs are withdrawn from the market prior to completion. No Australian studies have 
covered the Australian context, but data from 2004 to 2014 suggests that the percentage of 
withdrawn IPOs is almost 13%.  
2.8 Australian IPO Literature 
In Australia B. Dimovski and Brooks (2004) found that IPOs do not require stakeholder 
representation on the board of directors, these finding were contrary to previous finding that 
suggest the importance of stakeholder should be reflected in board representation. W. Dimovski 
and Brooks (2003) also explored underpricing and underperformance of Australian IPOs from 
1994 – 1999 and found that these were underpriced and underperformed in the market in the first 
year following their listing. The authors explored the level of underpricing dependant on whether 
the firm was a No Limit Liability company or Limited Liability company. 
Balatbat, Taylor, and Walter (2004) explored ownerships structure and corporate 
governance of Australia IPOs from 1976 to 1993. They examined 5 years of post-listing 
operating performance and confirmed that operating performance deteriorated over the first 4 
years after listing. Interestingly they found that board composition is not associated with 
operating performance but there was some evidence to suggest that independent board leadership 
is associated with better operating performance. 
In J. C. Y. How, Izan, and Monroe (1995) the authors explored the certification effect of 
independent external advisers, investigating accountants, the underwriter and its experts. They 
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reported only significant results highlighting a reputational effect of the underwriter on 
underpricing. 
2.9 Hypothesis Development 
2.9.1 Media Coverage 
The effect of news on stories has on the decision to withdraw has not been analysed. 
Carey et al. (2016) state that by providing streamline information about the IPO, this may reduce 
the uncertainty around the IPO and thus increase the probability that the IPO will be successful. 
This notion is one which we wish to explore within this thesis. They note that their significance 
finding points to a possible mitigation of information asymmetry and adverse selection problem. 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) and Ritter and Welch (2002) note that information asymmetry between 
investors and the issuer make it difficult for investors to price new issues. This effect is most 
notable with retail investors who suffer from Rock’s (1986) winners curse and thus as Carey 
(2016) argues, they may rely on the information contained within news articles. Therefore, if a 
firm experiences optimistic news coverage from the time it announces its IPO listing and before 
it is listed, it would be more likely that the uncertainty around the issue is reduced and thus be 
more likely to be fully subscribed.  
As discussed, Tinic (1988) theorises that most potential investors lack the incentive to 
undertake their own thorough investigations of the IPO firm. Therefore, increased media 
coverage (e.g., proxied by the number of citations in the Financial Times and the New York 
Times in Baker and Nofsinger Baker (2002)) of the firm pre-IPO would also be associated with a 
reduction in information asymmetry, which should lead to more accurate pricing of the issue 
(Pollock & Rindova, 2003).  
In the US, media coverage creates hype around an issue and thus lead to increased 
underpricing of Internet company IPOs DuCharme et al. (2001). The authors note an explanation 
for why the shareholders would accept a higher level of underpricing and not instead increase 
their reservation price in like of the positive media, this reason was noted as the need to leave a 
positive taste in investors mouths as the issuing firm had a high cash burn rate and therefore 
would need to return to capital markets soon. Without this mechanism, it becomes arguable that 
media coverage could have two effects; increased investors demand for the firm’s stock, and 
increases the issuing firm’s reservation price as the original shareholders want to maximise the 
proceeds they obtain from the IPO. This notion is supported by Liu, Sherman, and Zhang (2014), 
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who found that pre-IPO media coverage was negatively related to a firm’s cost of capital by 
examining the firm’s expected return one, two and three years after its IPO. This is consistent 
with the Merton’s attention model that predicts that stock that receive more attention should have 
lower rates of return and thus higher valuations (Merton, 1987). Therefore, the media coverage 
must have led to an increase in demand for the firm’s stock and an increase in the firm’s listing 
price on the day of its IPO thus avoiding the effect that was observed by DuCharme et al. (2001). 
This is possible as the listing firm does not set the price of its share until the day before the 
official date of listing.  
Gao and Ritter (2010) explored ways that issuers could shift out their demand curve in a 
SEO that were fully marketed. Therefore, we argue, in line with the findings by Boeh and 
Southam (2011), that news articles at the time of the company’s IPO aid in the reduction of 
information asymmetry by facilitating increased disclosure and allow for greater information 
dissemination with the increased information in the media. With reduced information asymmetry 
investors should expect lower agency costs, and thus a positive impact on IPO success.  
In Australia, where firms most commonly use the fixed price method, the issuing firm 
cannot change its offer price unless it withdraws its IPO. Therefore, media courage can only 
effect demand when the fixed price method is used, and therefore could lead to a greater 
likelihood of IPO completion. Carey (2016) also suggests that by providing streamlined 
information about IPOs public channels, news reports may reduce IPO uncertainty and increase 
the probability of the float being successful. We propose a way to explore phenomena in the 
Australian context by examining whether media coverage influences the probability of a firm 
completing its IPO. Therefore, the first hypothesis presented in this thesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  News articles about a firm or its IPO at the time of its IPO announcement 
have a positive effect on IPO completion. 
 
 We note that informative news articles reducing information asymmetry but these 
informative articles could yield either negative informative news or positive informative news. 
Alternatively, as it has been found previously uninformative news articles do not reduce 
information asymmetry and therefore certainty about the IPO. It is arguable that this types of 
news coverage has any effect on demand, without a reduction in uncertainty the only potential 
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effect these articles has on demand is either none, or potentially increasing investor awareness 
about the issue, which may increase demand. Because of the complexity around this issue, we 
purpose that the overriding effect is that news articles increase demand and thus IPO completion.  
2.9.2 Underwritten IPOs and the Risk of Undersubscription 
For companies undertaking an IPOs a considerable risk of the involved in the issue is the 
risk that the IPO is undersubscribed; this means that the company fails to sell all the stock on 
issue. In many instances, this results in the company pulling out of the listing process as they 
cannot satisfy the minimum amount of funds they require, in the US a company has the option to 
reduce their offer price, but in Australia if the company is using the fixed price method, which 
97% of our sample are, they must withdraw the IPO to do this.  
The offer price for the company’s stock is aimed to be set at the exact price at which all 
the stock to be issued can be sold to investors. The institutional bookbuilding method aids in this 
goal as institutional feedback ensures the price is set to a level that will ensure this goal is 
fulfilled, but this process is not common place and it remains the the price because fixed after the 
prospectus is lodge with ASIC and prior to any commitments to buy have been made. Within 
Australia, the size issues may impede the efficacy of this method as institutional investors are 
less motivated to undertake the required effect to come to their own determinations as to price. 
Thus, for companies that utilised the fixed pricing method, are at notable risk of having their 
issues undersubscribed. This risk exists for all companies undertaking an IPO and is the main 
reason companies opt to have their issue underwritten, where they make an agreement with an 
underwriter or a syndicate of underwriters to purchases all the shares available in the IPO and 
resell them to investors or purchase any remaining shares that fail to sell.  
A company may choose to have the entire issue underwritten or a proportion thereof. If 
they choose to have a proportion underwritten, then the risk of undersubscription would still be 
present. This thesis examines the effect of an IPO being partially underwritten on the probability 
of withdrawal therefore formally the following hypothesis is presented: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  There is a positive effect on IPO completion likelihood for a firm 
choosing to have their IPO partially underwritten.  
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Chapter 3 – Methodology 
3.1 Data Collection 
3.1.1 Data Sample Selection 
The sample consists of companies that between 2004 and 2014, either listed on the ASX 
or announced an intention to list on the ASX during but subsequently withdraw from the listing 
process prior to listing. Data was identified using the Connect4 database. Consistent with 
previous studies ((Boeh & Southam, 2011; Dunbar & Foerster, 2008)), we exclude all rights, 
equity and property trust and issues involving convertible instruments leaving 1169 listed 
companies and 172 withdrawn companies. 
Prospectuses for the withdrawn set of companies were obtained from the Connect4 
database, and historical financial information was extracted. Withdrawn companies with missing 
prospectuses and companies without historical balance sheet data contained within their 
prospectus were removed from the list of 172 withdrawn companies. We did not eliminate 
companies without historical income statement data because a number of firms that choose to 
IPO are firms that are ‘pre-revenue’ or do not have revenues for the year prior to the IPO. At this 
point, we were left with 137 companies within the withdrawn sample. 
Historical data for the listed companies was extracted from Bloomberg with missing 
information hand collected from the prospectuses. A macro was constructed to identify the 
financial year immediately before the IPO announcement date for each company; this financial 
year was then integrated into a search function to draw financial statement data from Bloomberg. 
Balance sheet data was extracted from Bloomberg in a similar fashion, except instead of a 
financial year, the current year was used because we sought balance sheet data of interest from 
when the company was still private. 
Amount sought from the IPO and the implied market capitalisation of the company when 
it firsts lists on the ASX for the withdrawn set of companies were drawn from the prospectuses 
combined with information from Connect4. A company’s implied market capitalisation was 
calculated by taking the average of the minimum and maximum and shares outstanding 
multiplied by the offer price. If the offer price was a range, then the minimum number of shares 
outstanding was multiplied by the minimum offer price, and the maximum offer price was then 
multiplied by the maximum shares outstanding. The market capitalisation of firms that 
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completed their listing was calculated by multiplying shares outstanding at the time of the listing 
and the offer price; this information was obtained from Bloomberg.  
Details of the company and the company’s IPO were collected from a combination of the 
company prospectuses, Bloomberg and Connect4. These details were:  
• the company’s industry (BICS – Bloomberg Industry Classification);  
• the year the company was created; 
• IPO announcement date;  
• offer price;  
• minimum and maximum shares on issue through the IPO;  
• the use of IPO proceeds;  
• whether the IPO was underwritten partially or fully; and  
• whether the withdrawn companies were involved in any M&A activity in the 12 
months after withdrawing their IPO. 
Company name changes present a challenge in any automated data collection processes; 
these were handled on a case by case basis. The process involved identify a name change by 
search the company name on delisted.com.au. At this point, an original company name could be 
identified, and this was then researched within the databases.  This was especially relevant for 
the collection of media stories mentioned within Factiva, detailed below. 
Companies with missing data were identified, and this data was attempted to be located 
by re-executing searches with updated company names and if this failed the company was 
removed from the dataset. Missing data also related to missing company prospectuses, if a 
withdrawn company’s prospectus could not be located this company was removed from the 
dataset. Finally, companies with dual listings were also removed. After this process was 
complete, we had 134 withdrawn companies and 729 listed companies remaining.  
3.1.2 Data Collection for the News Stories 
A search for each company within the dataset was conducted on Factiva. The period of 
interested was artificially constructed to be 30 days prior to the IPO and 180 days thereafter, the 
company name was searched and the number of search results recorded, duplicates were avoided 
by an option available on the search page. This continuous variable was then converted into 
dummy variables representing varying degrees of media coverage. It is noted that the search 
window was too large and should have been two weeks, this is because the IPO listing process 
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usually takes 3 to 4 weeks on average, but some IPOs are listed after two weeks. Thus, if we had 
reduced the search window down to 2 weeks after the IPO announcement date, we would have 
avoided including news articles after the company had already listed. It is noted that this factor 
does undermine the results and therefore was the basis for the motivation to only consider the 
dummy variable representing any news articles vs. no news articles.  
3.2 Testing the First Hypothesis – Media Coverage 
Withdrawal is modelled as a binary outcome using the PROBIT routine in STATA. We 
also calculated the marginal effects defined as: 
 
 (x),  
Where: () is the standard normal probability density function                
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);  
x is the mean value of the explanatory variable,  
and  is the coefficient estimate. 
 
Therefore, the marginal effects are show as the change in the probability of withdrawal 
give a one-unit change in the covariate. 
3.3 Testing the Second Hypothesis – Partially Underwritten 
In testing the second hypothesis, we are interested in estimating the effect of a firm 
having their IPO issue partially underwritten on the probability of a company having to withdraw 
its IPO.  
3.3.1 Study Design: Observational Study vs. Randomised Experiment 
In evaluating the effect of the choice to have an issue partially underwritten in hypothesis 
two, an ideal experimental design would be to take advantage of Rubin’s Casual Model and 
observed both possible outcomes for each firm undertaking an IPO (Rubin, 1974). In this design, 
we would observe withdrawal probability (Y) when the firm has their IPO partially underwritten 
(Y1), and when the same firm when its IPO is not underwritten (Y0). We would make each 
observation of Y under the same conditions so that the only difference is whether the firm 
received the treatment. If this was possible, we could take the average of the differences between 
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Y1 and Y0 for each firm within our dataset and this would give us the average impact of the 
treatment on the probability of withdrawal (Rubin, 1974).  
Because the firms cannot be observed having both the treatment and non-treatment we 
must obtain some estimate of what the probability of the firm withdrawing its IPO had it not 
received the treatment, this is known as the counterfactual. If we could undertake a random 
experiment the comparison group serves as a proxy for this counterfactual, because the treatment 
and non-treatment groups vary only randomly on observed and unobserved covariates, therefore 
the casual effect of the treatment could be calculated by comparing the outcomes between these 
groups (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983; Rubin, 1974) 
As this is not possible, we must utilise observational data consisting of companies having 
experienced the treatment and those who have not to serve as a credible estimate of the 
counterfactual. But, if we were to make a direct comparison this could be misleading as the 
treatment and non-treatment groups may differ systematically (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). 
3.3.2 Endogeneity: Selection Bias 
An observational study differs from an experiment in that the random assignment of 
treatments to units is absent. The absence of this randomisation makes it virtually impossible to 
be convinced that an estimation of a treatment effect is unbiased, this is because other variables 
that affect the depend variable besides the treatment may be differently distributed across 
treatment groups. Thus, the treatment effect estimation would be confounded by these variables 
(Cochran & Rubin, 1973). The lack of random assignment of the treatment in the observational 
data is a result of the treatment being a decision, made in consideration of varying factors that 
also are likely to influence the outcome that we are trying to assess.  
There are several matching techniques that allows for the creation of a counterfactual 
group in observational studies. This created group mimics a random assignment by balancing the 
distributions of the covariates across treatment and non-treatment groups, thus the only 
difference remaining is the treatment assignment. The limitation of this technique is that it only 
balances covariates that are observable and identified as confounding variables, in other words, 
the assumption of matching is that the unobserved private information is irrelevant (Kai & 
Prabhala, 2007). If these unobserved variables that affect who is receives the treatment are 
independent of unobserved variables that affect the out-come, then the endogeneity problem does 
not exist.  
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3.3.3 Planning the Observational Study To Deal with Select Bias (endogeneity) 
The first step in dealing with the presence endogeneity result from selection bias, was to 
first identify which were the major confounding variables that were likely to impact on the 
treatment effect estimation. This step is expounded in section 4.1.  
 The second step was to then decide on an appropriate technique to deal with the bias that 
would otherwise be present. One principal strategy is to utilise a matching technique which 
results in the distributions of the confounding variables to be similar in some respects across the 
treatment and non-treatment groups (Cochran & Rubin, 1973). This technique is a common 
procedure used to analyse a specific treatment (i.e. an event or certain factor of interest) on a 
company is to pair each company in the sample with a firm that has not experienced the 
treatment but are similar in all other aspects. The behaviour or outcome of interest within the 
sample group is then compared to the reference group (Chan, Lakonishok, & Swaminathan, 
2007). 
Matching methods utilise different: distance measures, (either propensity scores or 
Mahalanobis distances), matching algorithms (either greedy or optimal), and rules for 
comparison group member selection. The key differences between propensity scores and 
Mahalanobis distances is the weighting of the covariates. Propensity scores weight covariates by 
how well they predict group membership whereas Mahalanobis distance equally weight all 
covariates, taking into consideration variance and covariances as described above (Jacovidis, 
2017). 
I utilised the nearest neighbour matching algorithm which was developed by Abadie, 
Drukker, Herr, and Imbens (2004). This process uses Mahalanobis distances. Mahalanobis 
distance matching is not a propensity score technique, this technique was developed prior to 
propensity score matching (Cochran & Rubin, 1973). 
3.3.4 Methodological Details and Formulas 
3.3.4.1 Overview of Mahalanobis Distance Matching 
The first step in utilising this technique is to calculate Mahalanobis distances this formula 
is presented below in the Equation 0 below (Guo & Fraser, 2015):  
 𝑀𝐷(𝑖, 𝑗) = (𝒖 − 𝒗)𝑇𝑪−1(𝒖 − 𝒗) (0) 
Where: the distance MD(i,j) is the Mahalanobis distance between the treatment group member i 
and the non-treatment group member j, u and v are vectors of covariates for treatment group 
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member i and non-treatment group member j, respectively, and C is the sample covariance 
matrix from the full comparison group reservoir. (Jacovidis, 2017) 
Mahalanobis distances is a multivariate distance measure that uses the matrix of distances 
as well as the variance co-variance matrix to calculate the distance between the points. This 
process removes the covariance by treating each eigenvectors as a new axis, and then shrinks this 
new axis by √𝜆𝑖 , then calculate Euclidean distance between the rescaled points to get the 
multivariate distance measure (Mahalanobis, 1936) 
Only two treatment levels are permitted when using this method therefore we have split 
into them a control group with t = 0 and a treatment group with t = 1. There was the opportunity 
to split the number of news articles into numerous dummy variables, but it was decided that this 
would be only done at one level (not underwritten, either partially or fully) and then the 
treatment groups (underwritten partially). By coding the data this way, we can isolate the effect 
of each treatment as compared to companies without any treatment level. 
Matching estimators are based on the potential-outcome model, in which each company 
has a well-defined outcome for each treatment level. In the binary-treatment potential-outcome 
model, y1 is the potential outcome obtained by an individual I if given the treatment-level 0 
(StataCorp, 2015). The Average Treatment Effect (‘ATE’) represents the treatment effect at a 
population level; when selecting ATE within NNM each company within the dataset (t = 1 & t = 
0) has its counterfactual outcome imputed. The Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
(‘ATET’) represents the treatment effect for those within the dataset who received the treatment; 
when selecting ATET within NNM, each company with t = 1 has its counterfactual outcome 
imputed. 
 
The ATE can, therefore, be stated as: 
 𝜏1 = 𝐸(𝑦1 − 𝑦0) (1) 
and the ATET can be stated as: 
 δ1 = 𝐸(𝑦1 − 𝑦0 | 𝑡 = 1)  (2) 
 
For ATE NNM uses an average of the outcomes for companies that are most similar 
expect for the treatment level, to the unobserved potential outcome. The ATE options determines 
the effect at the population level but matching not only the treated companies but also the 
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untreated companies. ATET NNM again uses the average of the outcome companies that are 
most similar expect that it only predicts the unobserved outcomes for the treated group. NNM 
uses the covariates [𝑋1, 𝑋2, … , 𝑋𝑝] to find the most similar company that has the other treatment 
level (StataCorp, 2015). NNM within Stata is based on the results in in Abadie and Imbens 
(2006), (2011) and a previous implementation in Abadie et al. (2004). 
To use NNM, some assumptions must be made; their descriptions are sourced from the 
Stata guides (StataCorp, 2015). 
Firstly, independent, and identically distributed (i.i.d.) samples assumption, stipulates that 
the outcome and treatment status of one company is unrelated to the outcome and treatment 
status of all the other companies in the population.  
Secondly, conditional-independence (CI) assumption means that after we control for all 
observable covariates, the potential outcomes (counterfactual outcomes) are independent of 
treatment assignment. Unless we specifically control for a covariate that may be related to both 
the treatment assignment and outcome our model would violate this assumption. If there are any 
covariates that should be controlled for which are omitted, then we would be overstating the 
impact of the treatment on withdrawal likelihood.  
Finally, the overlap assumption states that each company has a positive probability of 
receiving the treatment. This means that we can match the treated company with similar 
nontreated subjects and vice-versa. If this assumption is not meet, then we would not be 
accurately assessing the impact of the treatment.  
3.3.4.2 Process 
Below sets out the details of the process used to implement the NNM technique. It begins 
with the first steps used in this process, namely, the identification of confounding factors that if 
not identified and controlled for would render any findings biased. This section then continues 
with the second step in the implementation of the NNM and outlines the specifics of this process 
with the Stata software as well as the modifications to some of the confounding factors to ensure 
the successful implementation of the NNM technique.  
3.3.5.2.1 Outcome Probit Model 
Before the NNM technique can be executed the ‘outcome model’ needs to be properly 
specified. The outcome model is a probit or logit regression of the outcome of interest dependent 
on several variables that are significant at a chosen level of significance. The independent 
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variables are included in the regression so that once the matching is conditional upon these 
variables, the treatment effect has been isolated.  
The baseline attributes of the company and the company’s IPO serve as confounding 
variables, in that they are related both to the outcome (withdrawal), and to the treatment 
assignment. There may exist other unobserved confounding factors that could influence the 
outcome; this is a limitation of the current technique. The variables that were tested for 
significance were: industry dummies; year of IPO dummies; use of proceeds; numerous 
profitability measures; numerous measure of company size include the implied/realised market 
capitalization of the company at the time of listing and logarithmic transformations of this and 
other measures; dummy variable representing if the company had revenues at the time of the 
IPO; age of the company; Debt to Equity (D/E) ratio and a dummy representing whether the 
company had a positive D/E ratio; amount sought through the IPO; amount sought ratio; 
retention ratio; leverage; Tobin’s Q (market value divided by book value of equity); the number 
of articles within news media around the time of the IPO announcement; dummies representing 
varying levels of articles within news media; and finally whether the IPO was underwritten 
partially or underwritten fully or not underwritten. The logic for include the treatments – 
underwritten fully/partially and news headlines, was to see if they should be incorporated into 
the outcome model when testing the alternative treatments. 
 
The outcome regression model forms the foundation of the outcome models used in each 
nearest neighbour matching estimate take the form: 
 Pr(𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑛 = 1 | 𝑋) =  Φ(𝑋𝑇𝛽) (3) 
Where:  
Pr denotes the probability,  
Φ is the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the standard normal distribution, and 
X is the vector of covariates which influence the outcome Withdrawn 
 
And is expressed as: 
W𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑛 =  𝛽1(𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑌𝑅) + 𝛽2(𝑅&𝐷) +  𝛽3 (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒
𝐷
𝐸
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜) +
 𝛽4(𝑁𝑜 𝑁𝑒𝑤 𝐴𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠)  +  𝛽5(𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) + 𝛽6(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜) +
 𝛽7 (log(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛))) + 𝛽7(𝐴𝑔𝑒) (4) 
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Where: 
𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑛 = {
 1,         𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑛
0, 𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑
 
 
Asset Turnover Ratio is used as a proxy for the company’s profitability; Research and 
Development is a dummy variable signifying that the company’s stated use of proceeds included 
this purpose; Revenues dummy represents if a company has revenue for the last financial year 
prior to the IPO announcement date; Bad year dummy is an artificially constructed dummy used 
as a proxy for dealing with the potential impact of hot or cold markets. Specifically it signifies 
that the company’s IPO announcement date was in a year were withdrawal of IPOs for that year 
were above the average withdrawal rate for the entire period; No news articles is a dummy 
representing that the company has no articles within news media around the time of the IPO 
announcement; Positive debt-to-equity ratio is a dummy representing that the company has a D/E 
ratio above zero; age of the company is a continuous variable in years; and log of total assets is a 
proxy for company size.  
Stata automatically tests for collinearity while running the regressions. No terms were 
found to be collinear. This probit model indicates which variables are significant on withdrawal; 
this model is altered depending on the specific research question being tested, further discussion 
on the way and how it is altered is discussed below. 
3.3.5.2.2 Nearest Neighbour Matching  
After the satisfactory outcome model was determined it was integrated into the teffect 
nnmatch function with Stata along with the treatment dummy. The output of teffects nnmatch 
should be disregarded at first as a test of the balancing of the covariates between the treatment, 
and the non-treatment group must be conducted first.  
The balancing testing for teffect nnmatch comprises of ensuring that the difference of 
each covariate within the outcome model is minimised as close to zero as possible (i.e. there is 
no difference). Furthermore, the ratio of variance of the covariate between treatment and non-
treatment group should be as close to 1 as possible.  
If a covariate fails to balance several strategies were adopted to deal with this. Each 
continuous variable posed some issues in terms of balancing. Asset Turnover Ratio (‘ATR’) for 
example failed balance throughout each test. A histogram of this variable showed that the data 
was skewed. After reviewing the data to check for errors the winsor command which winsorises 
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the variable was utilised to deal with outliers. Winsorization sets all outliers above a certain 
percentile to a specified percentile. This technique deals with balancing issues, and controls for 
outliers driving the treatment effect results.  
After the winsorization was conducted teffects nnmatch was rerun with the transformed 
ATR variable and the balancing test rerun. This process involved several iterative versions to 
before satisfactory balancing was achieved.  
The foundational outcome model is altered to include MAWithdraw as it could not be 
included in the probit estimate in the foundational model as it ‘0 predicts success perfectly’. Its 
inclusion in the outcome model used while executing the nearest-neighbour matching is to 
control for this covariates impact on the ATE estimate. It is unclear why it does not cause errors; 
it is believed that this is because nnmatch does not compute the probit or logit outcome mode. 
3.4 Identification of Confounding Covariates 
This section reports the result of the probit modelling that was conducted iteratively to 
identify which covariates had a significant effect on withdrawal probability. 
The predicted probability of withdrawal of an IPO for a company is:  
  
Φ (0.70 (𝑌2008) + 0.52 (𝑌2011) + 1.00 (𝑌2012) − 2.48 (𝑅&𝐷) −
 0.72 (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒
𝐷
𝐸
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜) −  1.29 (𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒) −  0.79 (𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦) −
 1.15 (𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛 𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑦) +  0.95 (𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)  −
0.70(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜) −  0.22 (log(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝)) −  0.02 (𝐴𝑔𝑒) + 2.21) (5) 
Where: 
Φ is the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the standard normal distribution.  
 
The results of this regression are provided in Table 1. It is noted that Log of Market Cap 
is not significant at an α of 10%; regardless, it is desirable to utilise this variable as a proxy for 
the sise of the company. The Log of Total Assets which is also a proxy for company size is 
significant at 5%, but market cap is preferred as total assets could not be balanced.  
While these variables have been included in the probit model M&A activity dummy 
which represents whether a withdrawn company was involved in M&A activity in the 6 months 
after its IPO withdrawal is included in the estimation of the treatment effect. The logic behind its 
ROAD BLOCKS TO BECOMING A PUBLIC COMPANY 47 
inclusion is that most of the post withdrawal M&A activity resulted in higher valuations than 
what would have been realised had the company completed the IPO listing.  
Table 2 - Probit regression results 
Probit regression   Number of obs = 863 
   LR chi2(8)  = 421.64 
   Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -161.77912   Pseudo R2 = 0.5658 
Withdrawn Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Y2008 0.70 0.31 2.28 0.02 0.10 1.31 
Y2011 0.52 0.24 2.16 0.03 0.05 0.99 
Y2012 1.00 0.39 2.57 0.01 0.24 1.77 
RD -2.48 0.30 -8.26 0.00 -3.07 -1.89 
PosDE -0.72 0.20 -3.53 0.00 -1.11 -0.32 
NewsCoverage -1.29 0.19 -6.79 0.00 -1.66 -0.92 
UnderwrittenPartially -0.79 0.29 -2.68 0.01 -1.36 -0.21 
UnderwrittenFully -1.15 0.22 -5.22 0.00 -1.59 -0.72 
RevYN 0.95 0.19 4.92 0.00 0.57 1.33 
AssetTurnoverRatio -0.70 0.23 -2.96 0.00 -1.16 -0.24 
lnMarketCap -0.22 0.15 -1.47 0.14 -0.51 0.07 
Age -0.02 0.01 -2.35 0.02 -0.03 0.00 
_cons 2.21 1.10 2.01 0.04 0.06 4.37 
 
Each of the continuous variables required a degree of manipulation to satisfy the 
balancing requirement when implementing the NNM technique. The NNM test examining the 
effect of an IPO being partially underwritten required different manipulation to the continuous 
variables when compared to the news articles analysis. This is because each test is based on 
either a different subset of the dataset or the entire dataset but with the composition of the 
treatment and non-treatment groups changes depending on the treatment being tested.  
Depending on the treatment variable being tested it and its associated variables are 
removed from the outcome model. During the news coverage testing, it is removed as it becomes 
the treatment variable. During the underwritten partially testing, both it and underwritten fully 
variables are removed; the treatment variable is underwritten partially, but all companies that are 
underwritten fully are removed from the dataset. 
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3.5 Data Overview 
This section of the thesis provides an overview of the data used in the analysis. Each 
section provides details on the covariates that are utilised within NNM for each test. Details of 
their manipulation and justification for this manipulation is also included.  
3.5.1 Timing of the IPOs 
Table 3 shows the number of firms listed for the year, number withdrawn, proportions of 
firms that withdrew each year when compared to the number of listed for that year, and finally 
the proportion of listed firms and withdrawn firms as compared to the total number of each 
group overall. This table gives the impression that the timing of an IPO offering impacts on the 
likelihood that a firm might withdraw. Notably, 2008 shows that the proportion of withdrawn 
firms for that year to be 45.16 percent as well as 2012 which has 43.33 percent.  
Table 3 - Number of filings per year 
Year Number of 
Listed 
Companies 
Number of 
Withdrawn 
Companies 
Proportion of 
Withdrawn 
Firms (%) 
Proportion of 
Total Listed 
(%) 
Proportion of 
Total Withdrawn 
(%) 
2004 70 7 10.00% 9.56% 5.22% 
2005 91 13 14.29% 12.43% 9.70% 
2006 89 16 17.98% 12.16% 11.94% 
2007 165 17 10.30% 22.54% 12.69% 
2008 31 14 45.16% 4.23% 10.45% 
2009 24 5 20.83% 3.28% 3.73% 
2010 78 15 19.23% 10.66% 11.19% 
2011 68 22 32.35% 9.29% 16.42% 
2012 30 13 43.33% 4.10% 9.70% 
2013 35 7 20.00% 4.78% 5.22% 
2014 51 5 9.80% 6.97% 3.73% 
TOTAL 732 134 18.31% 84.49% 15.51% 
 
During the search for significant confounding factors influencing withdraw, yearly 
dummies surprisingly had no significant effect. Noting that timing, namely, the hot and cold 
markets is an important issue highlighted within IPO literature, this issue is suspected to be a 
notable confounding factor on withdrawal likelihood.  
Figure 1 shows that 2008 and 2012 most evidently impact on withdrawal of an IPO, 
closely followed by 2011. These three years can also be seen to have the widest gap between 
Proportion of Total Withdrawn and Proportion of Listed (with Proportion of Withdrawn above 
Proportion Listed), these years are suspected to have a positive effect on withdrawal likelihood. 
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A gap can also be noticed with 2007, but this gap is created by a large proportion of Listed Firms 
as compared to Withdrawn Firms for that year; potentially this year might have a positive effect 
on completion of IPOs.  
Figure 1 – Proportion of IPOs Withdrawn or Listed each year from 2004 to 2014 
 
 
Each of these year dummies, when tested individually, are found to have a significant 
effect on withdrawal. When all are tested together, only 2008, 2011 and 2012 remain significant 
at α of 5%. To help with balancing during the treatment testing, a dummy variable that equalled 
the sum-total of all these dummies was constructed.  
Where: 
𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑌𝑅 = {
 1,         2008 𝑜𝑟 2011 𝑜𝑟 2012
0,                    𝐴𝑛𝑦 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
 
 
This variable is used in replacement of each of the yearly dummy variables above. There 
may be some issues relating to loss of data due to this truncation of three dummies into one, but 
this is accepted as the desirability for balancing supersedes this concern. 
3.5.2 Size of the Firms – Implied Market Capitalisation 
Because there are a small number of very large firms within our dataset, it was appropriate to 
take the log of Market Capitalisation to control for these outliers. In comparing Figures 2 (raw 
data) to Figure 3 (log of this data), we can see there is a vast improvement in terms of balancing 
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in the NNM testing. However, the Log of Market Capitalisation was also winsorised by 5% to 
achieve satisfactory balancing.  
Figure 2 – Histogram of Market 
Capitalisation of all Firms 
 
Figure 3 – Histogram of Log of Market 
Capitalisation of each Firm 
 
 
3.5.3 Profitability of the Firm – Asset Turnover Ratio 
The Asset Turnover Ratio for a company was calculated by: 
𝐴𝑇𝑅 =
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
A potential problem with this confounding factor is the lack of symmetry. When 
Revenues are greater than Total Assets, the ratio can take any value greater than one. If the 
inverse is true, then the ratio can only be within the range of zero to one. Taking the log of the 
ratio solves this problem and restores the potential for symmetry Dallal (2012).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – Histogram of Asset Turnover 
Ratios for all Firms 
Figure 5 – Histogram of Log of Asset 
Turnover Ratio of each Firm 
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Figure 4 & 5: Each of the above graphs is a histogram showing the distributions of each 
variable. Both variables when tested individually within the probit modelling were found to be 
significant. When integrated into the complete model the log of ATR caused collinearity 
problems. Furthermore, it failed to adequately deal with outliers which can be seen in Figure 6 
below. 
Figure 6 – Histogram of Asset Turnover Ratios for all Firms 
 
Figure 6: It is evident that the untreated group of companies would fail to have appropriate 
corresponding matches.  
The collinearity problem precludes this transformation from being of any assistance. The 
next step was to winsorise Asset Turnover Ratio by 12%.  
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Figure 7 – Overlap Assumption: 
Underwritten Partially Dummy vs Asset 
Turnover Ratio 
 
Figure 8 – Overlap Assumption: 
Underwritten Partially Dummy vs  
Asset Turnover Ratio (Winsorised) 
 
Figure 7: This graph shows that companies with their IPOs partially underwritten with higher 
Asset Turnover Ratio do not have corresponding companies with non-underwritten IPOs. This is 
where winsorisation of the data is implemented to deal with these outliers and therefore ensure 
that the overlap assumption is sufficiently satisfied.  
Figure 8: This graph is reproduced with Asset Turnover Ratio being replaced by Asset Turnover 
Ratio which is the same covariate but winsorised by 7%. Here it is evident that the treated group 
have corresponding untreated matches, but the reverse cannot be said for all untreated 
companies. Thus, when computing ATE where each company has its counterfactual imputed, we 
may have issues.  
3.5.4 Leverage – Debt to Equity Ratio  
Figure 9 – Debt to Equity Ratios for 
Withdrawn companies vs. Listed companies 
 
 
 
Figure 10 – Percentage difference of the 
number of Firms between Withdrawn Firms 
and Listed Firms with varying D/E Ratios 
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Figure 9: This graph shows the wide distribution of debt to equity ratios for all companies, of 
note is that Listed Firms as a group appear to have a higher degree of D/E ratios above 0.2 
onwards.  
Figure 10: is further evidence of this point. During probit model testing, D/E ratio did not have 
any significance in predicting the probability of withdrawal, however, noting the above, a 
dummy variable was constructed to include this information. 
Where: 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝐷𝐸 = {
1,
𝐷
𝐸
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛 0
 0,
𝐷
𝐸
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 0 𝑜𝑟 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟
 
This dummy variable proved to be significant and allow for satisfactory balancing within 
the treatment effect testing.  
3.5.5 Maturity of the Firm – Age 
This variable had several severe outliers which can be seen below in figure 11. 
Winsorisation was implemented at varying levels to condense the data.  
Figure 11 – Histogram of Age of all Firms 
 
 
Figure 12 – Histogram of Age all Firm 
(winsorised 12%) 
 
Figure 11 & 12: The first figure shows raw data where a small number of older firms can be seen 
followed by the next figure where the winsorised data which recategorised firms older than 11 
years old as 11 years old can be seen. 
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3.5.6 Use of IPO proceeds – Research & Design 
Table 4 - Number of companies: Use of proceeds – R&D vs. Withdrawn 
 
Withdrawn 
 R&D 0 1 Total 
0 246 132 378 
1 483 2 485 
Total 729 134 863 
 
Note:  Immediately it is notable that companies who state use of proceeds as R&D, they much less likely 
to withdraw. 
3.5.7 Media Coverage of the Firm’s IPO 
Various dummy variables were constructed representing varying ranges of news articles 
relating to each company’s IPO. Only the dummy representing any number new articles vs. zero 
was found to be significant. This dummy variable was included as a confounding factor in the 
first question within this thesis and becomes the treatment variable within the second question. 
Table 5 - Number of companies: News Coverage vs. Withdrawn 
  Withdrawn 
 NewsCoverage 0 1 Total 
0 298 121 419 
1 431 13 444 
Total 729 134 863 
 
Where: 
𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 = {
1, 𝐴𝑛𝑦 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐼𝑃𝑂
 0,                               𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐼𝑃𝑂
 
Note:  Immediately it is notable that companies with some degree of news coverage are much less likely 
to withdraw. 
3.5.8 Underwritten IPOs 
Two dummy variables representing whether the IPO was either underwritten partially or 
fully. Both variables are controlled for within the News Coverage testing. Within the 
Underwritten Partially effect testing a new variable was constructed that excluded all 
Underwritten Fully companies from the dataset; this was done, so the subset of only companies 
that were underwritten partially or not underwritten at all was identified. 
ROAD BLOCKS TO BECOMING A PUBLIC COMPANY 55 
Table 6 - Number of companies: 
Underwritten Fully vs. Withdrawn 
 
  Withdrawn 
 UnderwrittenFully 0 1 Total 
0 495 122 617 
1 234 12 444 
Total 729 134 863 
 
Table 7 - Number of companies: 
Underwritten Partially vs. Withdrawn 
 
  Withdrawn 
 UnderwrittenPartially 0 1 Total 
0 647 126 419 
1 82 8 444 
Total 729 134 863 
 
Where: 
𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑦 = {
1,                 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦′𝑠 𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝑤𝑎𝑠 𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛
 0, 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦′𝑠 𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝑤𝑎𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛 
 
 
𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 = {
1,                 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦′𝑠 𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝑤𝑎𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛
 0, 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦′𝑠 𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝑤𝑎𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛 
 
Note:  Each of the dummies when set to 0, represents both companies that were not underwritten and 
underwritten to the other level. 
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Chapter 4 – Results 
4.1 Hypothesis 1 Results - News Coverage 
Table 14 presents the results of the Withdrawal model with the estimated coefficients, 
marginal effects, and chi-squared statistics. The goodness of fit for the model is high, with a 
pseudo R2 56.41%. VIFs were calculated showing a maximum VIF of 1.62 suggesting 
multicollinearity is not an issue. The covariate for the log Market Capitalisation is not 
significant, but every remaining covariate is significant.  
Hypothesis 1 suggested that News Coverage would be negatively related to IPO 
withdrawal. The negative relationship between News Coverage and withdrawal provides support 
for H1, which is consistent with our expectations.  
 
Table 8 – Probit Regression – Withdrawal Model 
Withdrawn β dy/dx S.E. z  
[95% Conf. Interval] 
  
 
     
Intercept 2.1791  1.0839 2.0100  0.0546 4.3035 
Negative Year 0.6597 0.0699 0.1869 3.5300 *** 0.2935 1.0260 
Positive DE Ratio -0.7273 -0.0770 0.2030 -3.5800 *** -1.1253 -0.3294 
Use of proceeds – R&D -2.5080 -0.2656 0.3041 -8.2500 *** -3.1039 -1.9120 
Revenues Dummy 0.9588 0.1015 0.1940 4.9400 *** 0.5786 1.3390 
Fully Underwritten Dummy -1.1459 -0.1214 0.2212 -5.1800 *** -1.5794 -0.7123 
Partially Underwritten Dummy -0.7772 -0.0823 0.2926 -2.6600 ** -1.3507 -0.2036 
Age -0.0160 -0.0017 0.0069 -2.3200 * -0.0295 -0.0025 
Asset Turnover Ratio -0.7049 -0.0747 0.2357 -2.9900 ** -1.1669 -0.2428 
Market Capitalisation (ln) -0.2130 -0.0226 0.1469 -1.4500 
 
-0.5010 0.0750 
News Coverage Dummy -1.3093 -0.1387 0.1902 -6.8800 *** -1.6821 -0.9366 
        
Pseudo R2 56.41% 
Model change LR Test 420.33*** 
Pearson chi2 987.15*** 
Note: † p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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4.2 Hypothesis 2 Results - Average Treatment Effect - Partially Underwritten IPOs 
In testing, companies with IPOs that were fully underwritten were removed from the 
dataset. This is done to isolate the treatment effect; failure to remove fully underwritten IPOs 
would result in comparing the effect of a company having its IPO partially underwritten as 
compared to not underwritten at all or underwritten fully.  
Therefore, the underwritten partially dummy was varied removing the 0 for all companies 
that were underwritten fully; therefore n = 617, with the treatment group n = 90, and untreated 
group n = 527. 
4.2.1.1 Descriptive Statistics – Partially Underwritten IPOs vs. IPOs not Underwritten 
Table 9 - Descriptive Statistics: Partially Underwritten IPOs vs. IPOs not Underwritten 
    Partially 
Underwritten IPOs 
(n = 90) 
 IPOs not 
Underwritten 
(n = 527) 
Variable Min Max  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. 
Withdrawn 0 1  0.09 0.29  0.22 0.41 
NegYR 0 1  0.22 0.42  0.22 0.41 
RD 0 1  0.58 0.50  0.54 0.50 
PosDE 0 1  0.89 0.32  0.84 0.37 
NewsCoverage 0 1  0.57 0.50  0.50 0.50 
MAWithdraw 0 1  0.03 0.18  0.04 0.20 
RevYN 0 1  0.22 0.47  0.35 0.48 
Agew12 0 11  3.16 4.08  2.54 3.99 
ATRw7 0.00 1.17  0.18 0.37  0.16 0.35 
lnMarketCa~5 6.73 8.55  7.44 0.56  7.42 0.50 
Where:  (Yes = 1), (No = 0). 
NegYr = IPO announcement date within the year 2008 or 2011 or 2012 
RD = Use of proceeds - Research and Development 
PosDE = Company had (did not have) a positive D/E Ratio 
NewsCoverage = Company had (did not have) news headlines during the period 30 days prior to the IPO 
announcement date and 150 after this date 
MAWithdraw = M&A Activity within 12 months post withdrawal  
RevYN = Company has revenues for the financial year ending preceding the IPO announcement date 
Agew12 = Age of the company (winsorised) 
ATRw11 = AssetTurnoverRatio (winsorised) 
lnMarketCapw5 = Log of Market Capitalisation (winsorised) 
 
The descriptive statistic table gives the means and standard deviation of the confounding 
factors for the treatment and non-treatment group. As these are different the matching technique 
deals with this disparity between the groups. Thus this highlights the importance of testing for 
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balancing of this confounding factors to ensure the technique has achieved what it is designed 
for. 
4.2.1.2 Outcome model – Partially Underwritten IPOs 
A summary of the winzorisation is as follow: Asset Turnover Ratio winsorised by 7%. 
Age winsored by 12% which changed the age of firms older than 11 years to 11 years old. The 
log of Market Capitalisation winsorised by 5%. The high level of winsorisation of these 
covariates became necessary due to the decrease in the number of observations within the 
treatment group (n = 90). 
4.2.1.3 Balancing of the covariates between treatment and non-treatment groups – 
Partially Underwritten IPOs 
Before the results are examined the balances of the covariate is examined to determine 
whether satisfactory balancing has been achieved. As mentioned within the process section of 
this thesis, balancing is achieved with a visual examination of the balancing table. Balancing is 
achieved by reducing Standardised differences to as close to zero; with a variance ratio of as 
close to 1. No formal testing was conducted.  
Table 10 - Covariate balance summary: Underwritten Partially ATE 
 Standardised differences Variance ratio 
 Raw Matched Raw Matched 
NegYR* 0.01 -0.05*** 1.02 0.93** 
RD 0.08 -0.02 0.99 1.00 
PosDE 0.15 0.06*** 0.73 0.90** 
NewsCoverage 0.12 -0.01 0.99 1.00 
MAWithdraw -0.03 0.00 0.85 1.00 
RevYN -0.06 -0.02 0.97 0.98 
Agew12 0.15 0.06*** 1.05 0.98 
ATRw7 0.04 -0.01 1.11 0.94** 
lnMarketCapw5 0.05 -0.05*** 1.26 1.01 
Note:   
* Matching has reduced the balance of this covariate, noted by examining Raw (balance before matching) 
and Matched (balance after matching)  
** Variance ratios should be closer to one 
*** Standardised differences should be close to zero 
 
Countless iterations of the model were undertaken to improve balancing, in the end, this 
was the best model. It is noted that some papers within the Journal of Financial Economics have 
not examined the effectiveness of propensity score matching by testing the difference in the 
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means between the sample and control groups’ covariates, see: Tucker (2010) who identified the 
following papers: Hillion and Vermaelen (2004); P. M. Lee and Wahal (2004); Hale and Santos 
(2009); Faulkender and Yang (2010); Officer, Ozbas, and Sensory (2010). 
Noting the imperfect balancing of covariates, the results of this test are presented in table 
13. 
4.2.1.4 Average Treatment Effect Results – Partially Underwritten IPOs 
Table 11 - Average Treatment Effect Results: Partially Underwritten IPOs 
Treatment-effects estimation     Number of obs = 613 
Estimator : nearest-neighbor matching  Matches: requested = 1 
Outcome model : matching    min = 1 
Distance metric : Mahalanobis    max = 7 
  
AI Robust 
    Withdrawn Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
ATE 
      UnderwrittenPartially 
      (1 vs 0) -0.1081 0.0300 -3.60 0.000 -0.1669 -0.0493 
 
Interpreting these results, companies who have their IPOs partially underwritten are on 
average 10.81 percent less likely to withdraw their listing. We are 95 percent confident that the 
average reduction in withdrawal probability is between 4.93 percent and 16.69 percent. 
4.2.1.4 Robustness check 
The winsorisation of the data had no effect on the estimation of the beta coefficient, the 
winsorisation of some of the data was conducted to control for outliers and to improve on the 
overlap. This process did result in some loss of data, but this was accepted after consistency of 
the beta coefficient was observed and the importance of the overlap assumption was met. 
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Chapter 5 - Conclusion & Discussion 
5.1 News Article Coverage 
Our findings support the hypothesis that some level of news coverage helps to overcome 
information asymmetry, this asymmetry may prevent investors from arriving at their own 
opinions about the true intrinsic value of the issuing firm and thus aid in the company’s 
dissemination of information. Our findings could also be explained by the increased exposure 
news coverage has and thus allows companies to gain exposure that they would not have had 
previously. 
Our findings confirm our expectations that news coverage is a positive factor that reduces 
the company’s probability of having to withdraw its IPO. We found that having one or more 
news articles about the company at the time of its’ IPO has a statistical significant effect in the 
reduction of the probability that a company will withdraw; or conversely stated, having at least 
one news article has a statistically significant effect, which increases the probability of the 
company successfully listing.  
5.2 Partially Underwritten IPOs 
The risk of withdrawal due to undersubscription is removed when a company is fully 
underwritten. When the IPO is partially underwritten the risk of undersubscription still exists. We 
assume that the risk of withdrawal should be drastically reduced assuming the proportion of 
stock underwritten in the IPO is considerable. Interestingly we find that rather than drastic 
reduction in withdrawal risk our findings show a marginal reduction in the probability of 
withdrawal.  
Further analysis into partially underwritten IPOs and the reasons behind why they 
companies that choose to be partially underwritten also choose to withdraw would provide the 
necessary insight into fully understanding this result. A case study on these companies could 
provide that insight and may be worthwhile undertaking in the further.  
Within our dataset almost 20 percent of companies that were not underwritten withdrew 
their offerings, compared to almost 10 percent of companies that were partially underwritten. 
The most notable reason that these 10 percent may have withdrawn was to pursue more attractive 
alternatives, this factor, however, was attempted to be controlled for with the MAWithdraw 
dummy variable which signified that a company withdrew and then was immediately involved in 
some M&A activity.  
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More specifically the 8 companies within the dataset that were partially underwritten, 3 
of these companies withdrew and then were immediately involved in M&A activity. Therefore 
one would assume that the motivation to withdraw for these companies was not because they fail 
at the IPO but rather that they had a better option elsewhere. When we compared the amount 
sought in the IPO compared to the amount gained through the M&A activity we saw that 2 of the 
companies were able to make more than they would have in the IPO; one company looked as 
though the outcome would not be as favourable as completing the IPO. However, this company 
may not have proceeded with this M&A activity. As we controlled for M&A activity within out 
outcome model, it is assumed that this factors effect is removed from the result. Another two 
companies within this set of 8 ended up cancelling their ABNs. Clearly, this is not a desirable 
outcome. With one company that was involved in M&A activity, it also had its ABN cancelled, 
but this may not necessarily be a negative outcome. Thus, this brings us back to the quality 
factors which is unobservable. 
5.3 Limitations and future research  
The dataset includes a long period including both hottest and coldest IPO periods, and the 
timing which had a significant effect on withdrawal was control for within the matching model 
and the probit model. Withdrawal for many companies is justified by an argument that it was 
market conditions. Withdrawal represent a failure for investors to arrive at an equilibrium price 
which is set by the issuing firm. If the valuations of the issuing company are not above their true 
intrinsic value, then the company has failed to effectively overcome the information asymmetry 
issue. Potentially some company may be of poor quality, future research could attempt to 
distinguish these by analysing the survivorship of the withdrawn companies as opposed to 
companies that complete their listings.  
A final limitation for this study was the use of the matching technique, a notable 
economic assumption is that this technique assumes that private information is irrelevant and 
thus in adopting the matching technique to answer hypothesis two we have assume that this 
private information was not a source of endogeneity, future research could confirm our findings 
by, for example, using an endogenous probit treatment model, or Heckman twostep process. 
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